The Economics of Proof-of-Work by Liu, Debin
DEBIN LIu*
The Economics of Proof-of-Work
Abstract: Proof-of-Work is a set of cryptographic mechanisms that increase the
cost of initiating a connection. Currently recipients bear equal or greater cost per
connection as initiators. This allocation of cost enables resource abuse, exhaustion
attacks and denial of service, such as spam. The design goal of Proof-of-Work is to
reverse the economics of connection initiation on the Internet. The first economic
examination of Proof-of-Work, in the case of spam, argued that Proof-of-Work
would not work. This result was based on the difference in email production costs
between legitimate and criminal enterprises. This work illustrates that the difference
between production costs does not remove the efficacy of Proof-of-Work when work
requirements are weighted. This paper suggests that Proof-of-Work will work with a
simple reputation system modeled on the systems currently used by commercial anti-
spam vendors. This paper also addresses the idea that the proposed variation on
Proof-of-Work changes the nature of the corresponding proofs from a token currency
model to a notational currency model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Spam is a significant problem in that it consumes vast network and
human resources. If the Internet is an attention span economy, then
spam is wholesale theft. A secondary danger of spam is that it
significantly reduces the value of email as a channel for customer-
merchant and employer-employee communications.
Spam is so profitable that estimates of spam as a percentage of all
email have increased even as the total volume of email increases.
CipherTrust estimates more than 85% of all email messages are
unwanted spam. 1 Spam is malicious network activity enabled by the
otherwise virtuous cycle of network expansion. As the network
expands, spain becomes more profitable and thus, increases. Spam is
also a vector for other activities: distribution of malicious code,
phishing attacks, and old-fashioned fraud.
The core challenge of defeating spam is that the sender bears
almost no cost to send email. The cost is borne by the network service
providers and the recipients. In order to solve this problem, Proof-of-
Work can be used to alter the economics of spam by requiring that the
sender commit to a per-email cost.2 Proof-of-Work was presented as a
business and economic solution to spam. However, as Laurie and
Clayton illustrate Proof-of-Work on its own is not a solution to the
problem of spam.
This paper illustrates that Proof-of-Work systems function, in
economic terms, when combined with simple price discrimination
based on a two-state reputation mechanism. This paper begins by
describing Proof-of-Work and providing a review of the derivation of
the parameters used by Laurie and Clayton to evaluate Proof-of-Work.
The next section provides a brief overview of the current state of the
art of deployed anti-spam reputation systems. The core of the paper,
an illustration that Proof-of-Work can work with simple price
discrimination, is the focus of the next section. A note on Proof-of-
1 Secure Computing, TrustedSource: The Next-Generation Reputation System, White Paper,
http://www.securecomputing.com/pdf/CT-TS-WP.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007).
2 In the following paper "proof-of-work" is referred to as "proof-of-effort." Cynthia Dwork,
Andrew Golberg, and Moni Naor, "On Memory-Bound Functions for Fighting Spam," in
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003, Dan Boneh, ed., (New York: Springer-Verlag,
2003): 426-44.
3 Ben Laurie and Richard Clayton, "'Proof-of-Work' Proves Not to Work," May 3, 2004,
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-mcl/proofwork.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007).
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Work as currency and the effect of the inclusion of price
discrimination follows. Finally, this paper closes by asking why
theory and observed reality diverge and discussing how future
research will be used to answer that question.
II. DEFINING PROOF-OF-WORK
The core enabling factor of spam is that spam is cheap to send.
Proof-of-Work is designed to remove the profit from spam.
Proof-of-Work comprises a set of proposals. Different proposals
require that email senders make fungible payments, perform a
resource-intensive computation, perform a series of memory
operations, or post a bond before sending each message.4 This section
describes the initial Proof-of-Work proposal and details different
extensions and analyses of that proposal.
In 1992, the first computational technique for combating spam was
presented by Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. The fundamental
intellectual contribution of their approach was to require that an email
sender compute some moderately hard, but not intractable, function of
the message in order to initiate transmission. Initiating a transmission
means gaining access to resources: the network for transmission, the
user's storage in an inbox, and the user's attention span if the
transmission is accepted.5  The essence of Proof-of-Work is: "if you
want to send me a message, then you must prove your email is worth
receiving by spending some resource of your own."
The current popular Proof-of-Work system is the hashcash system.
Hashcash was derived from MicroMint and PayWord. 6 Hashcash is
implemented by requiring a sender to determine a hash collision.
7
4 See Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor, "Pricing via Processing or Combatting [sic] Junk Mail,"
in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92, ed. Ernest F. Brickell, (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1993): 139-47; Balachander Krishnamurthy and Ed Blackmond, "SHRED: Spam
Harassment Reduction via Economic Disincentives," AT&T Labs-Research,
http://www.research.att.com/-bala/papers/shred-ietf56-talk.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007).
5 Krishnamurthy and Blackmond, "SHRED: Spain Harassment."
6 See Adam Back, "Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure," August 1, 2002,
hashcash.org, 2002, http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf (accessed October 15,
2007); Ronald L. Rivest and Adi Shamir, "PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple
Micropayment Schemes," April 27, 2001, http://theory.csail.mit.edu/-rivest/RivestShamir-
mpay.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007).
7 Back, "Hashcash."
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A hash function is a one-way compression. Imagine a simple
function that took all the personal data from a database and reduced it
to a set of birthdays. The set of birthdays would be a compression of
the data. The function is one way because there would be no way to
produce the original data set from the information available in the list
of birthdays.
Collisions occur when two different inputs to the same function
result in the same output. For example, if the hash functions were
"what is your birthday," the "May 6" would be a collision of this
birthday hash of the author and Tony Blair. 8 This is because both have
birth dates of May 6. Any person can be subject to the "birthday
hash." Searching by birth date on the web obviously makes this easy.
However, imagine if finding such a collision required asking
individuals their date of birth until you obtained two people with the
same birthday. Odds are you would have to ask a few more than fifty
people. After finding that collision, the person who verifies would
only have to inquire with the two people you had found. Thus, the
person creating this birthday collision would have to do twenty-five
times as much work as the person verifying it.
Similarly, finding collision is difficult with cryptographic hash
functions, as many calculations (as opposed to personal queries) are
required for one collision. Yet the collisions are cheap to confirm as
the recipient needs only to make two calculations. These mechanisms
can be used to throttle systematic abuse of un-metered Internet
resources, such as email and anonymous re-mailers, in which the
sender can be required to compute some processing intensive function,
which can be used as a Proof-of-Work.
Of course, the time investment in any processing-intensive Proof-
of-Work system depends upon the specific platform. Work that might
take twenty seconds on a Pentium IV could take several minutes or
more on a Pentium II, and could be infeasible on a smart phone. To
address this problem, a Proof-of-Work pricing function based on
accessing large amounts of random access memory as opposed to raw
processing power was orignally proposed by Cynthia Dwork, Andrew
Goldberg, and Moni Naor. Later published work identified additional
memory-bound mechanisms.' 0 Since memory speeds vary much less
8 Cryptographic hash functions take any digital input and generate a non-predictable
repeatable output.
9 Dwork, Golberg, and Naor, "On Memory-Bound Functions."
10 Martin Abadi and others, eds., "Moderately Hard, Memory-Bound Functions," ACM
Transaction in Internet Technology 5 (2005): 299-327.
[Vol. 3:2
2007]
across machines than CPU speeds, memory-bound functions should be
more equitable than CPU-bound functions. While processing speeds
can vary by orders of magnitude, Dwork, Goldberg and Naor claim a
factor of four between the fastest and the slowest memory operations
across different platforms. The current Microsoft implementation,
Penny Black, is designed to be agnostic about the form of work and
requires only some form of work.'r
Processing cost was the basis of the original model and is the one
most examined. This paper concerns itself with the costs of
performing some moderately expensive computation as Proof-of-
Work, building upon the parameters in "Proof-of-Work Proves Not to
Work."'12 The objections to Proof-of-Work before were primarily
observations about the high variance not only in the wealth of senders,
but also in the processing ability of devices. 13  (Issues of power
consumption are another criticism. The dynamic system discussed in
future work will address this issue.) Yet, the combination of a
reputation mechanism and Proof-of-Work proposed in this paper
would work with any of the proposed Proof-of-Work systems.
1II. WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR PROOF-OF-WORK TO WORK
Proof-of-Work as a concept appears powerful enough to solve the
spam problem by changing the underlying economics of spam. Yet,
Laurie and Clayton show that it is not possible to discourage
spammers by means of a Proof-of-Work system without having an
unacceptable impact on legitimate senders of email.' 4  Obviously,
simply altering the parameters used in their model would resolve the
conflict between spammers and legitimate users. 15 However, such a
trivial argument would be neither productive nor engaging. The
numbers presented by Laurie and Clayton identify a critical issue, the
shift in the production frontier, which must be resolved for Proof-of-
Work to be feasible. Therefore their parameters are used to address
the feasibility of Proof-of-Work systems. Note that the general
models can be used with different parameters.
11 Microsoft Research, "The Penny Black Project," http://research.microsoft.com/research/sv/
pennyblack/index.asp (accessed October 15, 2007).
12 Laurie and Clayton, "'Proof-of-work' Proves Not to Work."
" Ibid., 2.
14 Ibid., 1.
" Ibid., 9.
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The following paragraphs review and discuss the parameters
calculated in "Proof-of-Work Proves Not to Work." By illustrating
that Proof-of-Work can work under those parameters, the specific case
is solved. This work illustrates that Proof-of-Work solutions can
work, if augmented by a simple reputation mechanism.
To begin a review of the previously determined parameters, recall
Radicati's estimation that as of November 2003, on average, 5.7x 1010
emails were sent and received per day by 5.13 x 108 email users on the
Internet using 9.02x 108 email accounts. 6 Brightmail's estimation is
that 56% of all emails are spam. 17  Using the Internet Domain
Survey's estimation18 that there were at that time a total of 2.3 x 108
hosts, Laurie and Clayton concluded that there are 3.2x 1010 spam and
2.5x1010 legitimate emails. 19 This assumes that each machine would
send an average of 125 emails per day. From their examination in
the UK, Laurie and Clayton further assumed that the proportion of
legitimate, non-list2' emails being sent by each machine is about 60%,
thus a final average of about seventy-five legitimate non-list emails
being sent is determined.22 These estimates are accepted.
Using cost estimates of processing power, Laurie and Clayton
estimated that the resulting price is $1.75 per machine per day for
email operations. Considering spammers used to charge as much as
0.1 cents per email, one spammer must send at least 1750 emails per
day to cover his cost.23 Therefore, the Proof-of-Work calculation time
must be 50+ seconds to remove the profit from spam at this price.
24
16 Radicati Group, Inc., "Market Numbers Summary Update, Q4 2003," news release,
November 5, 2003, http://www.radicati.com/uploadedfiles/news/Q4-2003PressRelease.pdf
(accessed October 15, 2007).
17 Brightmail Inc., "Spam Percentages and Spam Categories," 2004, http://www.nospam-
pl.net/pub/brightmail.com/spamstatsMarch2004.html (accessed October 15, 2007).
18 Internet Systems Consortium, "Internet Domain Survey, January 2004,"
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/ds/reports/2004-O 1/ (accessed October 15, 2007).
19 Laurie and Clayton, "'Proof-of-Work' Proves Not to Work," 3.
20 Ibid.
21 A "list" email is one that is sent to a large number of subscribers, for example SSRN.com
email "journals."
22 Laurie and Clayton, "'Proof-of-Work' Proves Not to Work," 4.
23 Ibid., 5.
24 Ibid.
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At this point, the critical difference between spam and legitimate
email must be addressed. Spammers and legitimate senders of email
have different production frontiers. Senders of legitimate email
purchase equipment and services on a free and open market.
Spammers use botnets which steal electronic services by subverting
end user machines. This means attackers break into end user machines
and add software that allows them to easily control the subverted
machines. In the same manner as professional network administrative
software, attackers can easily send one command to many machines.
The individual subverted end user machines are called "zombies."
The difference of production frontiers means that spammers and
legitimate senders of email have different costs. Laurie and Clayton
first estimated that 1.1 million machines might be owned by
spammers. 25 The result is a pool of a million machines that could send
32,000 spam emails each per day.26 Using these numbers, a situation
in which only 1% of email is spam means a Proof-of-Work calculation
time must increase to at least 346 seconds.
27
Thus in economic terms, the availability of zombie machines shifts
the production frontier for spammers. Spammers have a far lower cost
of email production than legitimate users. My proposal uses a two-
state reputation mechanism to addresses this difference in cost. In
fact, if the difference in the production frontier were on an order of
magnitude of a ten or twenty time decrease in cost, the reputation-
enhanced Proof-of-Work system described here would still work.
Finally, Laurie and Clayton examined logging data from the large
UK ISP. They found that although 93.5% of machines sent less than
seventy-five emails per day, a Proof-of-Work mechanism would
prevent legitimate activity by the 13% of users who send the most
email.28 In addition, because spammers may select fast machines
while legitimate senders are using relatively slow machines, the
impact on legitimate email senders could imaginably be worse.
25 Laurie and Clayton, "'Proof-of-Work' Proves Not to Work," 6.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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IV. CURRENT ANTI-SPAM REPUTATION MECHANISMS
Proof-of-Work has not been widely adopted as an anti-spain
mechanism. Microsoft is endeavoring to change this with the
introduction of Penny Black.29  Currently the anti-spam market is
dominated by subscriber services dedicated to blocking or filtering
spam. These services include AppRiver, Brightmail, and CipherTrust.
This section describes the reputation element of these various anti-
spain entities.
In general, the reputation systems for spain are designed to track
the history of a sender of email. Different mechanisms are used to
track and rate sender behavior over time. Behavior is classified in
these systems as good (i.e., sending legitimate email) or bad (i.e.,
sending spam or malicious mail). Malicious email includes phishing
attacks and mail containing malicious code, such as a virus or a worm.
Reputation systems may also create profiles for the identification of
known historical behavior. For example, a previously trusted account
sending out malicious mail may indicate a user who is trustworthy in
moral terms (not a spammer), but has been subverted and can no
longer be trusted.
The first generation reputation systems used simple blacklists and
whitelists. The Real Time Black Hole list is the best known of these
simple blacklists. Blacklists contain the IP addresses of known
spammers and virus senders and whitelists contain the IP addresses of
senders known to be legitimate. 30 Obviously, the first generation of
reputation systems had significant room for improvement. For
example, a sender's reputation could be affected by the behavior of all
senders with whom the sender shared network resources, or a sender's
reputation could be affected by malicious code that was sent out with
falsified origin or "sender" fields.
31
Later reputation systems included dynamically updated lists which
allowed reputation systems to adjust to rapidly changing conditions
and, arguably more importantly, included automatic updates which
mitigated the administrative burden of fighting spam. Increasing
29 Microsoft Research, "The Penny Black Project."
30 Viput Ved Prakash and Adam O'Donnell, "Fighting Spam with Reputation Systems," ACM
Queue, no. 9 (2005), http://acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=
showpage&pid=346 (accessed October 15, 2007).
31 O'Reilly & Associates, Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies,
ed. Andy Oram (California: O'Reilly, 2001).
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storage and processing power enabled more granular message scoring.
Blacklists were replaced with per-email numerical scores indicating
probabilistic weighing of the likelihood of spam. 32 Modem anti-spam
mechanisms are difficult to evaluate in detail because the mechanisms
for weighing and storing reputations are as much business intelligence
as they are art or science.
Researchers have created sets of requirements for reputation
systems and argue that an effective reputation system must be
dynamic, comprehensive and precise.33 Anti-spam reputation systems
must be based on actual enterprise mail traffic in order to keep the
spammers from gaining any advantage. 34 Today, the latest reputation
systems take a persistence testing approach to reputation scoring.
Some systems also evaluate the social network of the sender to
determine reputation scores. Both CipherTrust and Gmail have
significant information about the social network of recipients who
subscribe to their services.
Despite the existing commercial differentiation of systems, there is
a common core to the anti-spain reputation systems. Most of the
existing reputation mechanisms use the average of past feedback
reports to assess the reputation of one agent. Agents may be as
broad as a domain, based on IP address, or as narrow as a single email
address. Different reputation system providers have differing
characteristics, and therefore, differing cost functions and error rates.
The error rates published by commercial providers may be goals as
much as they are historical measurements.
The critical observations for this work is that reputation systems,
which function on a per-email, per-address or per-domain basis,
already exist. Complex rating mechanisms as well as historical
reputation mechanisms are currently used in commercial anti-spain
technology. The mechanism proposed here is not unduly complex in
comparison with current anti-spam products.
32 Prakash and O'Donnell, "Fighting Spam."
33 R. Jurca and B. Faltings, "Reputation-based Pricing of P2P Service," in Proceeding of the
2005 ACMSIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (New York: ACM
Press, 2005): 144-49.
34 Prakash and O'Donnell, "Fighting Spain."
" Ibid.
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V. PROOF-OF-WORK AUGMENTED WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION
This paper proposes a simple model combining a reputation
mechanism and Proof-of-Work scheme, which enables price
discrimination. The system is a step function: each email sent has
either a high or a low Proof-of-Work requirement. Effectively, this
paper proposes placing a corresponding low cost on known reliable
parties, with a high cost on those identified as spammers. Based on an
assumption that one zombie machine can be detected during several
minutes, the high Proof-of-Work cost requirement is implemented
after the first detected spam and held for a set duration. Emails are
rated based on a per-email or per-source basis.
Newcomers are overwhelmingly malevolent in the world of
SMTP36 servers. The research done by CipherTrust identified
approximately 50 million IP addresses which send approximately 70%
of all email on a daily or near daily basis.37 The other 30% comes
from EP addresses that have not been previously encountered. More
than 95% of that 30% of emails from new or unknown IP addresses is
malicious. 38 In other words, an IP address that is encountered for the
first time is approximately 95% likely be a zombie machine.
One way to detect a zombie machine quickly is to assume that
each new entrant is malicious until proven otherwise, as is common in
reputation mechanisms.39 Therefore, this paper proposes placing a
high cost on new entrants as well as identified spammers.
My model can be described as follows. When a newcomer arrives,
he or she will bear a high Proof-of-Work cost, H. The cost of any new
or previously malicious new email source will not be fixed at the
initial high cost forever. Newcomers can overcome the initial bad
reputation and associated higher cost by performing the Proof-of-
Work as required and sending only legitimate emails. After bearing
this cost when sending the first several emails, his or her reputation
will improve if there is no spam detected in his or her sent email. As a
result, the Proof-of-Work cost drops immediately to a much lower
36 SMTP stands for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. SMTP is used for the vast majority of
email.
37 Secure Computing, "Persistence Testing - Guilty Until Proven Innocent," TrustedSource:
The Next-Generation, 5.
38 Ibid.
39 Eric J. Friedman and Paul Resnick, "The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms," Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 10 (2001): 173-99.
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level, L. However, once one sent email is indicated to be spam, the
per-email Proof-of-Work cost to this sender will immediately increase
back up to H. After that, at any time a spam message is detected,
regardless of the nature of the subsequent emails, the following emails
will bear the high cost H as a punishment for some duration after the
last detected spam. The initial high Proof-of-Work cost should be
high enough to prevent any new entrant from being a profitable
zombie.
In game theory terms, the proposed model can be seen as a tit-for-
tat model with forgiveness. Defection, in this case of sending spam,
results in immediate punishment in the form of increased work. If the
participant then behaves well for the following emails, there is
"forgiveness." Therefore, a user who is wrongfully identified as a
spammer will not pay an indefinite price. Of course, in this simple
model the existence of blacklists is not addressed. Clearly, once a
participant has been repeatedly identified as a spambot, no email
would be accepted.
To examine this proposal, a simulation was developed to examine
the average Proof-of-Work cost to end users who are ill or well
behaved. In this simulation each was an event that was associated
with a probability. The probability decided the cost of each email
using two possible vaules: the cost of spam was H and the cost of
legitimate email was L. The various values assigned to the duration of
punishment were also considered. Email that was rejected for
inadequate Proof-of-Work was bounced to the sender.
The rates of error in spain detection were also considered in the
simulation. There were two error rates: one reflected the probability
of the false identification of legitimate email as spam; the other
reflected the incorrect identification of malicious email as legitimate.
According to vendor reports, software exists that can detect spam with
a level of accuracy which ranges between 92%-99%.40 Again, based
on vendor claims, the probability a legitimate email may be
mistakenly indicated to be spam is approximately 1%. Vendors'
tolerance of error types varies. Some vendors never throw out
legitimate email but detect less spam. Others detect more spam but
lose the occasional email.
Therefore, in this simulation, a single spam email was detected
with 99% accuracy while a legitimate email was mischaracterized at a
rate of 1%. The resulting expected cost for a spammer to send each
spam was approximately 349 seconds, which is close to Laurie and
40 Ian "Gizmo" Richards, "How to Reduce Spam," Support Alert Newsletter, November 2006,
http://www.techsupportalert.com/how-to reduce-spam.htm (accessed October 15, 2007).
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Clayton's estimate for the time required to discourage spammers. 41
For legitimate users, with 1% detection error, the expected cost of
sending each email was around fifty-two seconds. Again, this meets
the requirement that end users who send legitimate email are in fact
able to do so.
These results suggest that this Proof-of-Work model combined
with a step-wise reputation mechanism can work to discourage
spammers without overloading high-volume legitimate users.
VI. THE NATURE OF PROOF-OF-WORK
There is a fundamental distinction between Proof-of-Work as
generally described and Proof-of-Work with the proposed reputation
system. Proof-of-Work as initially described was a token currency.
Recall that money is a mechanism of exchange, a store of value and a
standard of value. With token money, the value is inherent to the
mechanisms of exchange and an exchange of a token is an exchange of
value. Token money is either inherently valuable or represents value
so that a token is not a function of the party exchanging it. The dollar
is an example of a token currency.
In contrast, notational money is exchanged based on notations in a
record-keeping system. A credit card charge is an example of
notational currency. Notational exchanges are not completed until
verified by the record-keeping party. In this case, Proof-of-Work
exchanges require the reputation-tracking party to verify that the
payment is adequate and thus valid. Penny Black, an on-going
research project by Microsoft is a completely notational
implementation of Proof-of-Work.42 Each user has an account, and
each email recipient decreases or credits that account. The model
allows those who fight spam to select costs based on the level of
granularity that is most effective. End users can keep history-based
records and bounce email without Proof-of-Work. ISPs could also
keep such records so that the individual user history is not an issue
when sending mail.43  Penny Black is a traditional notational
41 Laurie and Clayton, "'Proof-of-Work' Proves Not to Work," 6.
42 Microsoft Research, "The Penny Black Project."
43 Martin Abadi, and others, eds., "Bankable Postage for Network Services," Advances in
Computing Science - ASIAN 2003 (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2003): 72-90.
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instantiation that associates each email with exactly one Proof-of-
Work account.
44
Note that there is no requirement that the record-keeper and the
parties to the exchange are indeed distinct. There must be a notational
clarification for the Proof-of-Work to be accepted. An example of
where reputation-based Proof-of-Work would have a single party
evaluating and pricing might be in a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack, which is an attack to make a computer resource
unavailable to users by multiple compromised systems. Those parties
that have some history of transaction - either as identified by a DDoS
"cookie" or through another record of interaction - can pay the lower
cost. Those parties with no history will be required to pay the greater
Proof-of-Work. Indeed, an initial challenge can be easily modeled
under this system. The first response requires some "payment,"
meaning the duration is just one and the payment is equivalent to the
challenge. Notice that the duration "one" is indicated above as being
inadequate for the email case.
In contrast, a message from a whitelisted individual is the extreme
case where the low cost is zero, e.g., L=O. The simulations illustrate
that the case where the low cost is zero and the high cost is high (>400
seconds) would indeed function within the parameters given. In this
case, users either pay a very high Proof-of-Work cost to send email or
are members of a whitelist. Recall individuals could each maintain
their own whitelists. Those who would initiate conversations would
then either pay a premium or obtain an introduction.
Proof-of-Work can work. However, Proof-of-Work requires some
notational elements to function in a world where it is impossible to
distinguish prima facie between the legitimate and criminal markets.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH
The modeling in this paper illustrates that Proof-of-Work would
work if the work factor were high for spammers and low for known
users. Multiple mechanisms that are not traditionally considered
Proof-of-Work can fit under the Proof-of-Work rubric. Examples of
this include challenge and response mechanisms that require anyone
who is not part of the history of the recipient to respond to an email or
perform some work for the email to be received. Yet, these
mechanisms have not proven to reduce global spam.
4Microsoft Research, "The Penny Black Project."
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The next level of research will be on market dynamics.45 In the
model presented here, and in all other models of Proof-of-Work, there
is an assumption that Proof-of-Work is ubiquitous. The assumption of
instant, uniform, adoption is common to both computer science and
economics and extremely rare in the world on which these sciences are
focused. This model suggests the addition of a dynamic element to it
so that at any point in time, the number of individuals who adopt a
system is a function of the number of users at the previous time.
This paper proposes using the standard equations for a natural
dynamic system. However, in these systems, rate of infection, rate of
recovery and mortality may be known. Also, due to birth and death,
the number of participants changes over time (e.g., equation 3 in
footnote 45 will not hold). In Proof-of-Work these are complete
unknowns. Thus, the model can be updated based on market adoption
and network observations.
46
Note that the diffusion measure in this dynamic model is correlated
with the likelihood of spain detection in the probabilistic model above.
This is because some people use Proof-of-Work, then the other people
who do not use Proof-of-Work will never detect spam under the
definition that spam requires Proof-of-Work.
The dynamic nature of Proof-of-Work provides one possible
explanation of why Proof-of-Work is not currently effective: because
the expected probability of adoption is arguably well under 60% even
considering the ad hoc adoption of Proof-of-Work equivalents. 47 The
45 To be more specific, set number of users of POW to POWu and the number of users who do
not as POWn. At any time, some percentage of users will reject POW, POWr, and others will
adopt POW, PO Wa.
POWu[t + 1] = POWu[t] + POWa[t] - POWr[t] (eq.1)
POWn[t] = POWn[t] + POWr[t] - POWa[t] (eq.2)
While the total number of users does not change,
e.g., POWn[t+l] + POWu[t+l] = POWn[t] + POWu[t] (eq.3)
46 See Indiana University Network Operations Center, "Network Operations Center Services,"
March 1, 2001, http://www.indiana.edu/-uits/telecomi/noc/ (accessed October 15, 2007).
47 Individual decisions on accepting or rejecting POW depend on its ubiquity of adoption of
POW.
POWr[t+1] = -aPOWu[t] + [POWn[t] (eq.4)
POWa[t +1] = yPOWu[t] - 8POWn[t]
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modeling of the market dynamics provides one way to test this
hypothesis.
One implementation that is based on individual accounts is Penny
Black by Microsoft.48  There are reasons not to adopt Microsoft's
Penny Black mechanisms unrelated to network effects or
interoperability. 49 Penny Black uses a notational mechanism whereby
the participants must have a mutually trusted server (or set of servers)
that issues per-email tickets. Email recipients then contact the
centralized server again to determine if the ticket is valid. This allows
for per-user pricing. However, depending on the implementation, this
has the potential to allow Microsoft unprecedented levels of social
network information, information on internal corporate
communications, and other information from traffic analysis. Of
course, Penny Black does not require that an "identity" be linked to an
account, only that an email address is linked to an account. While the
potential for anonymous accounts is built in, its actual usability and
anonymous strength is uncertain. Certainly, no company competing in
any market with Microsoft would be interested in providing such
information, and end users may be similarly loathe to provide such
personal details. The observation of the diffusion of the Microsoft
Proof-of-Work mechanism Penny Black will enable, over time, an
empirical measure of these constants.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory efforts to stop spain must address a variety of business
practices, expectations of customer/merchant relationships, cultural
traditions of sales, and enforcement against suspect actors. These
efforts must be coordinated at a global level, as even one regulatory
spain haven would prevent effective prosecution. Given the difficulty
of regulation of far worse crimes, as extreme as extermination of
endangered species for profit and the traffic of human beings, spam is
unlikely to be prevented by regulation alone. Unlike these heinous
crimes, spam is a numbers game. Spam response numbers are
relatively low; therefore, the efficacy of spain depends on being able
to blast out large amounts at a low price. If Proof-of-Work causes
spammers to become more targetable, the high overall cost of spam to
the network and society as a whole is greatly reduced. It is the mass
48 Microsoft Research, "The Penny Black Project."
49 Martin Abadi and others, "Bankable Postage."
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nature of spam that damages the network, and it is exactly that
characteristic that makes it possible for Proof-of-Work to in fact work.
Proof-of-Work reverses the cost model of email by charging the
sender instead of the user. This paper has proposed the combination
of Proof-of-Work and a simple reputation mechanism. This paper
illustrated that, for legitimate email users, the cost is acceptable; for
spammers, the cost is prohibitive. Using multiple simulations, the
paper illustrated that Proof-of-Work with a simple reputation
mechanism can work over a wide range of values. The result raises as
many questions as it answers, and a research agenda is offered as a
method of moving forward.
Recall that a uniform Proof-of-Work mechanism will not work
because any price high enough to stop malicious email will be so high
that it will hinder legitimate users. In fact, the low cost of stolen
network goods (e.g., botnets) requires that the cost to a spammer be an
order of magnitude higher than the cost to a legitimate user for Proof-
of-Work.
This work examines Proof-of-Work as part of a larger anti-spain
effort. Current anti-spam vendors use reputation systems as well as
per-email spain evaluation mechanisms. These efforts suffer from
penalizing new IP addresses and discarding incorrectly identified
email. The types of error are difficult to balance. Either new entrants
are not allowed to send email, or each new IP address is allowed to
send enough email that spam remains profitable. Proof-of-Work can
be combined with per-email spain identification and source reputation
to create more effective anti-spam technologies.
Proof-of-Work can work, using the economic conditions derived
as necessary from previous work. In summary, this article has
examined Proof-of-Work as an element of anti-spam technologies as
combined with source identification or per-email evaluation. As such,
Proof-of-Work could work.
[Vol. 3:2
